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A.: Labor Relations--Union-Employer Contract--Employee's Rights
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
LABOR

RELATIONS-UNION-EMPLOYER

CONTRACT-EMPLOYEE'S

RIGHTS.-SUit by employees of a coal company for breach

of

contract between the labor union and the employer, by failing to
allow plaintiffs a thirty-minute lunch period during each workshift. From a decree dismissing the complaint, plaintiffs appealed.
Held, employees could have sued on the contract, had they not been
barred by a provision therein making arbitration a condition
precedent to the right to sue. Judgment affirmed. Pettus v. Olga
Coal Co., 72 S.E.2d 881 (W.Va. 1952).
It seems that the court assumed an important labor relations
result in this case by supporting the proposition that an employee
can sue on the union-employer contract, without recognizing that
this right once was, and still is, in some jurisdictions, refused the
employee.
There seem to be three views as to the employee's right to sue
on a union-employer contract:
The first view: Employees cannot sue on contract. In Kessell
v. Great Northern Ry., 51 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1931), P sued for
wrongful discharge on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement made between D, the employer, and the union, of which P
was a member in good standing. The court held the action was not
maintainable, holding that the agreement was between the railway
company and the brotherhood organization, and constituted no
contract between any member-employee and the company. Accord,
Rotnofsky v. Capital DistributorsCorp., 262 App. Div. 521, 30 N.Y.
S.2d 563 (1st Dep't 1941).
In Hudson v. Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry., 152 Ky. 711, 154
S.W. 47, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 184 (1913), the court refused to allow
an employee to sue on the employer-union contract, stating the
employee was not bound by the contract to work for any length
of time, and this being so, either party has the right to terminate
it at any time with or without cause.
In Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S.W. 136
(1904), the court held that the function of the union was to secure
good working conditions for its members, "leaving to each of its
members to determine for himself whether or for what time he
will contract with reference to such usages." This reasoning was
used: ".

.

. a labor union, in contracting with an employer with

respect to wages and conditions of service for a specific period of.
time, does not establish contracts between its individual members
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and the employer, a breach of which will sustain actions by individuals ....
The members of the union do not labor for the
organization, but each member works for himself, and whatever
compensation he receives is for the benefit of himself and his
family."
The employee sued on the contract between the union and the
defendant employer in Wilson v. Airline Coal Co., 215 Iowa 855,
246 N.W. 758 (1983), and the court held, in refusing judgment for
the plaintiff, that the contract was not a contract of employment
since a contract requires consideration and the union gave nothing
as consideration.
The second view: Employees can sue on contract as principals.
Several courts follow this school of thought. However, for the
employee to recover under this view, he must show either that he
initially authorized the making of the contract or that he later
ratified it. In West v. B. & 0. R.R., 103 W. Va. 417, 187 S.E. 654
(1927), the court said: ". . . the rule seems to be that individual
members of a labor union are not bound by contracts between the
union and employers, unless such agreements are ratified by the
members of the union as individuals, and that in the absence of
evidence of such ratification by a member, no rights accrue to him
which he can enforce against the employer." The court speaks in
terms of agency, in that the employee-principal is not liable to the
employer until he ratified the act of the union, his agent, at which
time the employee can also sue on the contract.
In Christiansen v. Local 680, 126 N.J. Eq. 508, 10 A.2d 168
(1940), the court adopted the agency view and further held that the
union had no cause of action against an employer for wrongful discharge of four union employees, in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. The action for the wrong committed could only be
brought by the allegedly wrongfully discharged employees.
The court allowed the employees to recover on the contract in
Mueller v. Chicago &N.W. Ry., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N.W. 798 (1985),
stating, "Plaintiff is entitled to sue on the contract as one made
in his behalf by a duly authorized agent. That is, this suit must
be considered as one by a party to, rather than by a mere beneficiary
of, the contract."
The third view: Employees can sue on contract as third party
beneficiaries. Many courts support the view, not that the union acts
as agent for the employees in negotiating collective bargaining
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agreements with employers, but that the union is the principal
for the benefit of its members, as illustrated by the instant case.
Thus, a contract made by a labor union with an employer may be
enforced by an employee even though he is not mentioned by name
in the contract.
The West Virginia court, in Gleason v. Thomas, 117 W. Va.
550, 186 S.E. 304 (1986), permitted the employees to enforce the
contract between the employer and the union, but failed to indicate
the theory under which the parties were bound.
In Yazoo 8c Miss. Valley R.R. v. Webb, 64 F.2d 902 (5th Cir.
1933), the court allowed a non-union employee to recover on the
union-employer contract under the third-party beneficiary theory.
The Mississippi court permitted recovery under this theory in
Gulf & S.LR.R. v. McGlohn, 183 Miss. 465, 184 So. 71 (1938).
Accord, Schlenk v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 74 F. Supp. 569 (D.C.N.J.
1947).
A distinction between the agency theory and the third-partybeneficiary theory is that, under the former, the union has little
retained by way of direct enforcement, with whatever rights of
enforcement the contract provides given the employees on whose
behalf the contract was entered into; while under the third-party
theory, both the union and the individual employees are able to
enforce the contract.
Thus, the courts of many states, including West Virginia,
have not been consistent with their reasoning in regard to the
right of the employee to sue on the union-employer contract.
The third-party beneficiary theory seems the most satisfactory
and just method in dealing with this problem, and the West Virginia court seems to have applied this theory in the principal case.
J. L. A.

NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE HOSPITAL-INSURANCE.--

P brought an action against D, a charitable hospital, for injuries
sustained as a result of the negligence of its employee, alleging that
D carried liability insurance out of which a judgment could be
satisfied. D demurred on the basis that coverage by insurance did
not create liability in instances where the policyholder was immune
from liability because of its charitable character. Held, on certification, that D was not liable; that the immunity still existed even
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